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(3) exaggerated distinction; and (4) blurring assimilation. They,
or some of them, are sometimes taken for granted in two
senses: first, it is thought that any simplifying the object of study
or using external resources to characterize it are doomed to
be excessive and thus deserve to be charged with negative
‘over ’-character; second, it is assumed that the four complaints
may be made indiscriminately in evaluating any comparative
project without regard to the orientation and methodological
strategy of that study. A metaphilosophical examination of the
four ‘sins’ will help to effectively identify the distinct character
and objectives of a variety of orientations and their approaches.

1. Historical orientation aiming at historical
description

Three Orientations and Four ‘Sins’ in
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Without pretending to exhaust all working orientations, I intend
to highlight three major orientations and their distinct
methodological approaches in comparative studies whose due
examination, in my opinion, would be most helpful for a
constructive development of comparative philosophy.1 I plan
to do this by discussing the appropriateness of four ‘sins’ that
are oft-cited in critically evaluating a comparative project. The
reason that I take this strategy is this: the appropriateness or
legitimacy of the four ‘sins’ depends on the purpose and
orientation of a comparative project that would decisively
determine which kind of methodological approach should be
taken and what kind of expectations are appropriate; the
strategy is an effective way to identify how crucial aspects and
purposes of those orientations and approaches are distinct
and so, in treating one’s own comparative project or critically
evaluating some other ’s comparative project, to be more
sensitive to its distinct purpose and orientation and thus to
what it is appropriate to expect.2
When comparative projects are critically evaluated, there
seem to be four sorts of complaint. The alleged ‘sins’ are these:
(1) over-simplification; (2) over-use of external resources;

The first orientation under examination aims to give a historical
and descriptive account. That is, the primar y concern and
purpose of this type of comparative study is to accurately
describe relevant historical matters of facts and pursue what
thinkers in comparison actually thought, what resources were
actually used (by them), and what appear to be similar and
different. The orientation of this type of comparative study thus
might be called ‘historical orientation,’ and its methodological
approach aims at accurate description of historical matters of
fact. The historical orientation requires its practitioners to cover
a vast range of historical data to give such ‘factual’ description.
It seems that this orientation and its cor responding
methodological approach are typically taken in Chinese
studies or Sinology as the primar y approach to Chinese and
comparative philosophy; they are also taken by some scholars
in the field of philosophy.
There is no wonder that the aforementioned four oft-cited
‘sins’ would be assumed relevant to those comparative
projects with the historical orientation. First, to accurately
describe something, it is taken for granted that one should not
simplif y what is actually complicated; in other words,
simplification is always oversimplification: any simplification
is guilty of being negatively excessive; and simplification is thus
identical with falsification. Second, as for over-use of external
resources, any conceptual or explanatory resources which are
used to interpret a thinker’s idea under examination but were
not actually used by the thinker herself are rendered
inadequate or excessive: use of external resources is always
over-use of external resources. Third, in this approach,
exaggerated distinctness often results from over-simplification
of one or both parties under comparative examination in the
direction of ignoring part(s) in one tradition or account that
would share something in common in another tradition or
account; in this way, insofar as the sin of over-simplification
has been already legitimately charged, the charge of
exaggeration of the due distinction (if any) between the two
would be appropriate. Fourth, in this approach, blur ring
assimilation often results from over-use of external resources
to interpret one or both parties under comparative
examination, especially when the external resources used to
characterize one party come from the other party; to this extent,
insofar as the sin of over-use of external resources has been
already legitimately charged, the resulting assimilation of
blur ring the distinction between the two would be also
adequately charged.
There would be nothing wrong or inadequate with the
historical orientation and its methodological approach per se,
when the orientation/approach is adequately taken as one of
a number of alternative orientations/approaches, instead of
the exclusive one, and when one can see its limitations in
serving other distinct purposes in comparative studies. In view
of this, one question would be natural: Are there any
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orientations and approaches other than the historical
orientation that would be adequate, and, more importantly,
necessary in view of certain purposes in comparative studies?
With a positive answer to the question actually being
presupposed in the preceding discussion, the question can
be phrased in another way : How are other legitimate
orientations and methodological approaches possible and
necessar y? In the following two sections, I will focus on two
other orientations and their respective methodological
approaches.

2. Interpretation-concerned orientation aiming at
understanding and elaborating
The second orientation in comparative studies is concertned
with interpretation4 through elaborating a thinker’s ideas under
examination; the primar y concer n, or purpose, of this
orientation is to enhance our understanding of a thinker ’s ideas
via some effective conceptual and explanator y resources,
whether or not those resources were actually used by the
thinker herself. It is clear that a purely historical approach does
not fit here: To elaborate and understand the thinker does not
amount to figuring out exactly how the thinker actually thought;
instead, such interpretation and understanding might include
the interpreter’s elaboration of the implications of the thinker’s
point, which might not have been considered by the thinker
herself, or the interpreter’s representation of the thinker ’s point
in clearer and more coherent ter ms or in a more
philosophically interesting way, which the thinker herself might
have not actually adopted. In both cases, given a thinker’s ideas
(in one tradition or account) under interpretation, some
effective conceptual and explanator y resources well
developed in another tradition or account are consciously used
to enhance our understanding of, and elaborate, the thinker ’s
ideas; those resources used are thus tacitly and implicitly, but
constructively, in comparison and contrast to those original
resources by means of which the insight or vision was
somehow delivered, insofar as such comparison of the two
distinct sorts of resources is not expressly and directly
conducted. The term ‘constructively ’ here means such tacit
comparative approach intrinsically involves how the
interpreter of the thinker ’s ideas could learn from another
tradition or account regarding resources to enhance the
interpreter ’s understanding of the thinker ’s ideas; therefore,
some constructive philosophical engagement between distinct
resources in different traditions is tacitly involved in this
orientation and its corresponding methodological approach.5
In this way, the so-called over-use of external resources
is not necessarily a sin but might really enhance our
understanding of a thinker ’s ideas or clarify some original
unclear or confusing expression of her ideas. Consequently,
the endeavor per se of using exter nal resources in this
orientation is not automatically inappropriate and thus is not
doomed to be a sin, as it would be in the historical orientation.
As indicated in discussing the historical orientation, ‘blurring’
assimilation might result from ‘over’-use of external resources
when interpreting one or both parties under comparative
examination, especially when the external resources used to
characterize one party come from the other party. But, for the
purpose of interpretation, the resulting assimilation is not
necessarily a sin but might illuminate the essential connection
and common points between the assimilated ideas at the
fundamental level so as to enhance our understanding of those
ideas.
It is clear that a comparative project with the
interpretation-concerned orientation, instead of the historical
orientation, is free or tends to be focusing on, and elaborating,

a certain aspect, layer or dimension of a thinker ’s ideas based
on the purpose of the project, the reflective interest of the
person who carries out the project, etc. Indeed, instead of a
comprehensive coverage of all aspects or dimensions of the
object of study, focusing on one aspect or dimension is a kind
of simplification. Now the question is this: Is any simplification
per se doomed to be indiscriminately a sin of over
simplification? It should be clear that, if the purpose of a
comparative project is to focus on interpreting or elaborating
one aspect or dimension instead of pretending to give a
comprehensive historical description, charging the practitioner
of this project with over-simplification or doing something
excessive in simplifying the coverage into one aspect or
dimension would be both unfair and miss the point.
Let us agree that a comparative project should be guided
by some comprehensive understanding. But a comparative
project taking a certain methodological perspective through
focusing on one aspect of the object of study is not
incompatible with a comprehensive understanding. At this
point, what needs to be recognized is an important distinction
between a methodological perspective as working approach
and the methodological guiding principle that an agent
presupposes when taking the methodological perspective and
that would be used by the agent to guide or regulate how the
perspective would be applied and evaluated. One’s reflective
practice per se of taking a certain methodological perspective
amounts to neither reflectively rejecting some other relevant
methodological perspective(s) nor presupposing an
inadequate methodological guiding principle which would
render irrelevant other relevant methodological perspectives
(if any).6
We have discussed three ‘sins’ (i.e., ‘over-simplification,’
‘over-use of external resources,’ and ‘blurring assimilation’)
that might be charged against a comparative project with the
interpretation-concerned orientation. How about the other
one, the sin of ‘exaggerated distinction’? This case is more
complicated than it may appear. This sin, as discussed before,
is connected with the sin of over-simplification when the
comparative project assumes the historical orientation. But
when a comparative project takes the interpretationconcerned orientation and does ‘simplify’ the object of study
by focusing on one aspect of the object of study, is it
automatically guilty of the sin of ‘exaggerated distinction’? The
preceding distinction between the methodological perspective
and the methodological guiding principle is helpful here again.
What is at issue is whether the interpreter has assumed an
adequate methodological guiding principle to guide and
regulate how to look at the relation between the current
methodological perspective used as a working perspective and
other relevant methodological perspective(s) that would point
to other aspects of the object of study. Consequently, when
one evaluates a comparative project, what really matters is
for one to look at what kind of methodological guiding principle
is presupposed behind the working perspective; only when
this is examined can the charge of ‘exaggerated distinction’
be adequately evaluated.

3. Philosophical-issue-concerned orientation aiming
at joint contribution
The primary purpose of this orientation in comparative studies
is to see how both sides under comparative examination could
jointly and constructively contribute to some commonly
concerned issues of philosophy,7 rather than to focus on
providing a historical account of each or on interpreting some
ideas historically developed in a certain tradition or account.
Typically, in comparatively addressing a certain commonly
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concer ned issue of philosophy, some substantial ideas
historically developed in distinct philosophical traditions or
accounts are explicitly and directly compared with the aim of
showing how they could jointly contribute to the common
concern in complementar y ways.8 Insofar as constructive
engagement in dealing with various common concerns and
issues of philosophy is most philosophically interesting, this
comparative orientation and its methodological strategy
directly, explicitly and constructively conducts philosophical
engagement and is thus considered to be most philosophically
interesting. To highlight the characteristic features of a
comparative project with this primar y orientation, let us
examine the appropriateness of three charges, among the
aforementioned four, that have been sometimes or even often
brought against comparative projects with this orientation, that
is, the ‘sin’ of oversimplification, the ‘sin’ of over-use of external
resources, and the ‘sin’ of blurring assimilation.
A typical procedure of conducting a philosophical
engagement in such comparative projects could be both
conceptually and practically divided into three phases: (i) the
pre-engagement phase in which certain ideas in different
traditions or accounts that are relevant to the common concern
under examination and thus to the purpose of the project are
focused on and identified; (ii) the engagement phase in which
those ideas internally engage with each other in view of that
common concern and the purpose to be served; and (iii) the
post-engagement phase in which those distinct ideas from
different sources are now absorbed or assimilated into a new
approach to the common concern under examination. The
three ‘sins’ aforementioned may be considered to be typically
associated with different phases. The ‘sin’ of over
simplification regarding a certain idea identified from a certain
tradition may be typically associated with reflective efforts in
the pre-engagement phase; the ‘sin’ of over-use of external
resources regarding elaborating a certain idea from a certain
tradition may be typically associated with reflective efforts in
the engagement phase; and the ‘sin’ of blurring assimilation
may be typically associated with reflective efforts in the postengagement phase. Now let me briefly evaluate the
appropriateness of the three ‘sins’ respectively in the
corresponding three phases; looking at the ‘sins’ in this way
will help to highlight features of comparative projects primarily
with the philosophical-issue-concerned orientation.
(1) In the pre-engagement phase, it might be not only
legitimate but also adequate or even necessar y to have
simplification and abstraction of some ideas in one tradition
or account into such a perspective: this perspective per se is
presented in most relevant terms to the common concern
addressed, and the purpose ser ved in an issue-concerned
comparative project, while without involving those irrelevant
elements in the tradition or account from which such a
perspective comes, though those irrelevant elements in that
tradition might be relevant to figuring out the point of those
ideas. The reasons are these. First, the primary concern of the
project is not with how such an idea is related to the other
elements in the source tradition or account but with how it is
relevant to approaching the commonly concer ned
philosophical issue. Second, while one needs to understand
the point of an idea in the context in which it was raised, once
one understands the point (either through employing data
provided by projects with the first two orientations or through
one’s own background project with one of the first two
orientations), there would be no present purpose served by
discussing background. Third, it is clear that such an approach
per se does not imply denying the social and historical integrity
of the idea in the source tradition; the point is that the existence

of such integrity cannot automatically guarantee an
indiscriminate priority or even relevance of expressly
addressing it in any comparative projects without regard to
their orientations and purposes.
(2) In the engagement phase, relevant perspectives from
different source traditions would constructively engage each
other. From each party ’s point of view, the other party is
something exter nal without; but, from a more broadly
philosophical vantage point and in view of the commonly
concerned issue, the distinct views may be complementary
within. In this context, the term ‘external’ would miss the point
in regard to the purpose here: the pivotal point is not this or
that distinct perspective but the issue (and its comprehensive
approach) to whose various aspects those perspectives point;
in view of the issue, all those perspectives are internal in the
sense that they would be complementar y and indispensable
to a comprehensive understanding.
(3) In the post-engagement phase, some sort of
assimilation typically results from the preceding constructive
engagement; that is, such assimilation would adjust, blur and
absorb different perspectives into one new approach as a
whole; this would be what is really expected in this sort of
constructive engagement in comparative studies, instead of a
sin.
It should be noted that, if a comparative project that
explicitly has one of the preceding orientations is considered
as a project-simplex in comparative studies, a comparative
project in philosophical practice might be a complex that goes
with a combination of two or more orientations.9 For example,
a comparative project concerned with an historical figure often
consists of such a combination. Recognition of the
characteristic features of the above three distinct comparative
orientations and their respective methodological approaches
would help us discriminatively treat different stages or parts
of a comparative project-complex.

4. Due emphasis on philosophical engagement in
comparative studies
Traditionally, to my knowledge, comparative projects with the
above third and second orientations (especially when resorting
to contemporar y development and resources of philosophy)
have yet to receive due emphasis for some reasons. First, as
far as comparative projects regarding Chinese and Western
philosophies are concerned, a comparative project tends to
be taken as a mere by-product or extension of studies of the
classical Chinese philosophy which itself sometimes tends to
be taken largely as merely historical studies of the history of
(the classical) Chinese philosophy. Second, on the other hand,
comparative approach as a methodological approach has not
yet been considered primarily as an effective approach to doing
philosophy per se. Third, the aforementioned four ‘sins’
(especially, those of ‘oversimplification,’ ‘over-use of external
resources’ and ‘blurring-assimilation’) have been more or less
considered as some taken-for-granted ‘sins’ and have thus
discouraged reflective efforts in the direction of the third
orientation (or even the second orientation) which would often
unavoidably but appropriately commit those ‘sins’ in many
cases. Fourth, most importantly, Chinese philosophy and
Western philosophy (especially its mainstream traditions) are
sometimes taken as being essentially alien to one another;
this kind of mentality would undermine or preempt any serious
reflective efforts in comparative projects with the third
orientation and, in my opinion, negatively contribute to
prejudice. Western philosophers as well as some scholars in
studies of Chinese and comparative philosophy may assume
that Chinese philosophy is not philosophy in the sense of the
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term ‘philosophy ’ that is intrinsically related to a series of
fundamental concerns and issues as addressed in Western
philosophy (especially its mainstream traditions).
Now, as more and more philosophers in the fields of
Chinese and comparative philosophy have a holistic
understanding of Western philosophy (both its past and its
contemporar y development, both its appearance and its deep
concerns, and both its distinct working perspectives and its
guiding principles at a deep level) and become constructively
engaged with Western philosophy on a series of fundamental
common concerns and issues, it is more widely agreed among
philosophers who are familiar with both Chinese and Western
philosophies that they are not essentially alien to one another:
they have common concerns with a series of fundamental
issues in philosophy and have taken their characteristic
approaches to them. They thus could learn from each other
and jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise
through constructive dialogue and engagement. Consequently,
there is serious need to emphasize comparative projects of
the third and second orientations, though this emphasis
certainly would not deny the legitimacy or value of the first
orientation as one effective approach but stress its constructive
compatibility with the other orientations.10, 11

Notes
1. By ‘comparative philosophy ’ I mean not merely comparative studies
of different philosophical traditions but any comparative investigation
concerning distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches
(perspectives, guiding principles or instruments) or substantial points
of view in different traditions or within the same tradition, though I
sometimes cite philosophical traditions to illustrate relevant points.
2. Because of space limitation, I cannot give detailed examples in
the text to illustrate my theoretical points regarding those orientations
and methodological approaches under discussion; instead, in the
endnotes, I will refer the reader to my relevant writings in comparative
studies that either illustrate my points here or provide more
explanations.
3. By ‘external resources’ I mean those resources that were not
actually used by the ancient thinker under discussion when the
resources are identified from the historical point of view or with the
historical orientation. Nevertheless, as I explain later, using the ver y
term ‘external’ in some situations would simply miss the point in
regard to the purpose of the third orientation to be discussed.
4. In this article, I use the ter m ‘interpretation’ in a nar row or
straightforward sense as specified here (in terms of elaborating and
understanding) rather than in a broad or implicit sense in which all
the three orientations discussed here could be somehow identified
as ‘interpretation-concerned’.
5. For example, one can interpret the point of the Yin-Yang way of
thinking delivered in the Yi-Jing text or the point of the opening
passage of the Dao-De-Jing by taking such a comparative approach
and consciously employing some conceptual and explanator y
resources of contemporar y philosophy to interpret some central
message of the Yi-Jing text or Lao Zi’s central message in the opening
passage of the Dao-De-Jing. For my own interpretations of both taking
this kind of comparative approach, which illustrate points in this paper,
see Bo Mou, “ Werden-Sein Komplementarität: Die Yin-Yang Metaphysische Sicht des Yijing,” Polylog: Zeitschrift für interkulturelles
Philosophieren, 7 (2001), pp. 42-51 and Bo Mou, “Ultimate Concerns
and L anguage Engagement: A Re-Examination of the Opening
Message of the Dao-De-Jing,” The Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol.
27, no. 4 (2000), pp. 429-39. [A substantial expansion of the latter
article, “Eternal Dao, Constant Names, and Language Engagement,”
appears in Bo Mou, ed. Comparative Approaches to Chinese
Philosophy (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002)].
6. For a detailed and systematic discussion of the distinction between
the methodological perspective and the methodological guiding
principle and its implications, see Bo Mou, “An Analysis of the Structure
of Philosophical Methodology—in View of Comparative Philosophy,”

in Bo Mou ed. Two Roads to Wisdom?—Chinese and Analytic
Philosophical Traditions (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), pp.337-64.
7. It is arguably right that many issues that were traditionally identified
as ‘unique’ issues in different traditions have tur ned out to be
concerned primarily with different aspects, layers or dimensions of
some commonly concerned, more general issues of philosophy,
especially from a more broadly philosophical vantage point. This is
one point that I have endeavored to make and illustrate in my several
writings mentioned in the endnotes.
8. For example, we can examine how, say, Dewey and Laozi could
jointly contribute to the issue of the nature and function of moral rules
and the related issue of the nature and function of moral experience
in certain complementar y ways. For a detailed discussion of this to
illustrate points advanced in this paper, see Bo Mou, “Moral Rules
and Moral Experience: A comparative analysis of Dewey and Laozi
on morality,” Asian Philosophy, Vol. 11, no. 3 (2001), pp. 161-78.
9. For an illustration of what I mean by ‘a comparative projectcomplex,’ interested readers might look at my article “The Structure
of Chinese Language and Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun
Hypothesis” (Philosophy East and West, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1999), pp. 45
62) in which the three orientations under examination are combined
together and interplay.
10. As a collective effort to meet such need, the International Society
for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP)
has been recently established. With its general purpose of promoting
comparative studies of Chinese and Wester n philosophy and
facilitating academic contact and exchange of ideas and information
among interested scholars, the ISCWP (i) emphasizes (but is not
limited to) the constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy
and Wester n mainstream philosophy (analytic and continental
traditions in their broad senses), (ii) stresses the sensitivity of such
comparative studies to contemporar y development and resources of
philosophy and their mutual advancement, and (iii) through the
characteristic path of comparative studies of Chinese and Western
philosophy, strives to contribute to philosophy as common human
wealth as well as to respective studies of Chinese philosophy and
Wester n philosophy. As one effort in this direction, an ISCWP
international conference “Philosophical Engagement: Davidson’s
Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy ” will be held (for details, see “Call
for Papers” for this conference on the APA website,
www.apa.udel.edu/apa/opportunities/conferences/2003/jul/
iscwp.html).
11. I am grateful to Chad Hansen, Douglas Heenslee, Chen-yang Li,
You-zheng Li and Xiang-long Zhang for their helpful comments and
criticism of an early version of this article.
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